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amounts that have been previously deducted as depreciation. 77
Underlying the apparent inconsistency between the *theoryof section 1231 as originally enacted, and the effect of section 1245, are the
conflicting policies of providing substantially equal tax treatment to all
taxpayers similarly situated, and fostering the maximum investment in
modem equipment and facilities. Unless Congress wants to adopt a
completely different concept of depreciation, based upon price level
rather than historical cost,7 8 a concentration on the enforcement of
depreciation deductions in order to prevent abuses under section 1231,
rather than a virtual elimination of its beneficial incentive effects, would
be a more equitable method of resolving this conflict.
MicHmiL L. JAMmSoN

THE TORT LIABILITY OF
FLORIDA MUNICIPAL CORPOBATIONS
When the rule of municipal immunity from tort liability was evolving, municipal activities were confined almost exclusively to the essential requirements of government, such as police protection and fire
fighting. Since the turn of the century, however, municipal activities
have gradually encompassed broader functions, some of which were
formerly considered basically the province of private enterprise. This
expansion of function, coupled with 'the increase in the number of
municipal employees and the greater risks accompanying the complexities of the Machine Age, means that an ever-increasing number of
persons will suffer injuries from governmental operations. The question
of where to place responsibility for these injuries raises serious problems.

77. See Hearingson H.R. 10650 Before the Senate Committee on Finance, 87th
Cong., 2d Sess. 742 (1962).
78. See Paton, Depreciation-Conceptand Measurement, 108 J. Accountancy,
Oct. 1959, p. 88; Gflmour, Need for Price Level DepreciationPoses a Challenge to
Accounting, 40 Nat'l Ass'n of Accountants Bull., July 1959, p. 29.
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The doctrine of municipal immunity from tort liability was developed by 'the judiciary as protection for the municipality against the
possibility of an unbearable financial burden. At the time of this development, the courts were also applying doctrinal immunities to private
corporations, thus transferring the risks and dangers of the corporate
activities 'to the victims of business enterprise rather than letting them
fall upon the enterprise itself.1 The immunities protecting private
corporations began to weaken in the early 1900's, and many of these
immunities are no longer in effect. By contrast, the corresponding weakening of the immunity protecting municipal corporations has not been
effected to the same extent, despite almost universal protest by commen2
tators, and criticism by many judges.
Although municipal immunity has been generally upheld, there are
contradictory elements in -theapplication of this doctrine by the courts.
Notwithstanding the courts' insistence that they are obligated to apply
the rule of immunity of municipalities, there has been judicial restriction
of the doctrine.3
The most substantial restriction upon the doctrine has been the
modem rule that municipal corporations are liable for torts resulting
from acts performed in the proprietary capacity of the municipality.
This has increased the liability of municipal corporations as the concept
of proprietary acts has been steadily expanded. However, the maze of
contrariety marking the judicial effort to classify particular functions as
governmental or proprietary demonstrates the lack of any sound foundation for this distinction. 4 There are irreconcilable inconsistencies in the
judicial classification of most newer and some older municipal functions;
even within any one jurisdiction, a consistent pattern cannot be gleaned
from the cases. "The conflict and confusion . . . [may be attributed] to
the judicial compromise between the unfairness of complete immunity
and the dread of complete liability."5 Even if the line of demarcation
between governmental and proprietary functions could be established
satisfactorily now, problems would continue to arise because the functions of municipal government are being continually extended. Moreover, what is today a public obligation and a governmental function
might not so clearly be one tomorrow. The proprietary-governmental
distinction has been employed by the courts as a vehicle for escaping
the full force of immunity from tort liability.
1. Green, Freedom of Litigation, 38 ILL. L. REV. 355, 359 (1944).
2. ibid.
3. Muskopf v. Coming Hosp. Dist., 55 Cal. 2d 211, 219, 359 P.2d 457, 461

(1961).
4. Borchard, Government Liability in Tort, 34 YALE LJ. 1, 13 (1924).
5. Repko, American Legal Commentary on the Doctrines of Municipal Tort
Liability, 9 LAw & CONTEmnP. PROB. 214, 216 (1942).
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FRoM TORT LABImrrY

Both the legal commentators and the judiciary have critically examined the rationale underlying municipal immunity. One common explanation is based on the theory that a municipal corporation acting in
its governmental capacity is acting as an arm of the state. The state is
not subject to suit in tort, and its appendage possesses a like immunity."
However, a state enjoys its immunity because of the lack of a remedy
against it. It must be recognized that courts generally have adequate
jurisdiction over municipal corporations. Therefore, when both the
wrong and jurisdiction over the wrongdoer exist, immunity cannot be
justified by this analogy. Moreover, the basic premise that a municipality
is an anatomical part of the state is open to question. A municipality is
an independent governmental unit and functions as such, subject to the
limitations in its charter from the state.7
Another justification for the doctrine of municipal freedom from
liability is that the primary duty of the municipality is owed to the
public. Therefore, even though negligence may cause damage to an
individual, the benefit of the discharge of a public function is deemed an
outweighing consideration justifying immunity. Such immunity is necessary to enable a municipal corporation to perform properly all its
functions and assume new ones.8 Clearly, "the Administration cannot
be held to the obligation of guaranteeing the citizen against all errors or
defects, for life in an organized community requires a certain number of
sacrifices and even risks."9 Several arguments can be offered in rebuttal
to the theory that it is better that the individual suffer a wrong than to
imposed liability on the government.
First, corporate power coupled with responsibility may cause a
greater conscientiousness by those in charge of the operations. 10
Second, a basic concept in the law of torts is that liability follows
negligence. Individuals and corporations are responsible for injuries
caused by the negligence of their agents and employees acting in the
course of employment. Government immunity is directly counter to this
concept."- The paramount consideration should be the injury to the
person and not the character of the person who causes it.

6. Id. at 219.
7. City of Miami v. Bethel, 65 So. 2d 34, 36 (Fla. 1953) (concurring opinion).
8. Repko, supra note 5, at 219.
9. Borchard, supra note 4, at 1.
10. See City of Miami v. Bethel, 65 So. 2d 84, 38 (Fla. 1953) (concurring
opinion).
11. Molitor v. Kaneland Community Unit Dist., 18 III. 2d 11, 20, 163 N.E.2d

89,93 (1959), cert. denied, 362 U.S. 968 (1960).
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Third, municipal immunity has been considered an invasion of the
rights of the individual. The Florida court has stated that,1 2
If there is anything more than a sham to our constitutional guarantee that the courts shall always be open to redress wrongsE131
and to our sense of justice that there shall be a remedy for every
wrong committed, then certainly this basis for the rule cannot be
supported.
The courts are bound to protect the rights of citizens against invasion,
whether perpetrated by an individual or a government.
Perhaps most important of all is a current social trend in the United
States from individualism toward collective responsibility, including an
assumption by the body politic of much of the loss created by all manner
of individual misfortunes.14 For example, the normal costs of business
today include such things as workmen's compensation and pension
funds. 5
One of the primary considerations underlying the doctrine of municipal immunity is fear of the tremendous financial burden that liability
would cast upon the taxpayer. Experience of private enterprise, and of
those municipal corporations that have adopted a rule of liability, has
indicated, however, that this argument has little practical basis. Tort
liability takes up a very small proportion of the operating costs of any
well-organized enterprise. 10
Moreover, although public liability insurance is common in private
enterprise, it has been treated by the courts as if it were a barely tried
invention. Schemes for prepaying and sharing risks were relatively rare
when American courts adopted the doctrine of governmental immunity.
In 1963, however, liability insurance is no new device; it would merely
occasion a minor tax increase.' 7
Another consideration advanced in support of the doctrine of immunity is that negligent municipal employees are not protected by the
immunity of the municipality and are thus personally liable to the injured party. This argument lacks effectiveness for three main reasons.
First, this may be inadequate protection for private citizens injured by
12. Hargrove v. Town of Cocoa Beach, 96 So. 2d 180, 182 (Fla. 1957).
13. FLA. CONST. Decl. of Rights, §4: "All courts in this state shall be open, so
that every person for any injury done him in his lands, goods, person or reputation
shall have remedy, by due course of law, and right and justice shall be administered
without sale, denial or delay."
14. Stason, Governmental Tort Liability Symposium, 29 N.Y.U.L. REv. 1821

(1954).
15. See Repko, supra note 5, at 217.
16. Green, Freedom of Litigation,88 ILL. L. Rv. 855, 879 (1944).
17. Williams v. City of Detroit, 864 Mich. 231,259-60, 111 N.W.2d 1, 25 (1961)
(concurring opinion).
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the municipal agents because of the uncollectibility of judgments against
most city employees. Second, such liability on the part of the employee
alone means that the risks of accepting public employment fall upon the
subordinate with unjust severity and, ultimately, with detriment to the
public. The risk of such liability, coupled with low pay, may result in
failure of the subordinate to properly perform his duty.18 Third, if the
employee is judgment proof, the imposition of liability on the municipality will not affect his incentives to avoid tortious conduct while performing his job. For a financially stable employee, the incentive still
remains because his liability is not removed, the imposition of municipal
liability merely making an additional party liable. It must be recognized,
of course, that proper administrative supervision of employees is a better
inducement to careful and diligent public service than is the fear of
liability. 9
Many commentators and judges feel that relief from the present state
of confusion in the tort law of municipal corporations must come from
the legislature. This disavowal of the judicial power to remove the
existing governmental immunity has generally been based on two arguments: First, statutory enactments affecting municipal immunity demonstrate that the legislature has determined that the change is not to be
made by the court, and second, the rule has become so firmly entrenched
by force of stare decisis that only the legislature can change it.20 The
reasoning is 'that the legislature, through its committees, hearings, and
other processes, can best investigate the considerations relating to the
removal of municipal immunity. The imposition of municipal tort liability must be accompanied by provisions for paying claims, authorization of a tax levy, and its expenditure. The courts are neither equipped
nor authorized to undertake such a task.21
On the other hand, particularly in the absence of such legislation,
the courts must be free to correct their own errors and to establish new
rules when the circumstances of modem life have rendered the old rules
unworkable and inequitable.
THE -HARGROVE DEcIsIoN-TE DATH KNEL OF
MUNiCxPAL TORT IMMUNrTY?

In 1958, Justice Terrell declared in his dissenting opinion in City of
Miami v. Bethel22 that the question of abolishing or modifying munici18. Borchard, Government Liability in Tort, 34 YAIE L.J. 1, 8 (1924).
19. Fuller & Casner, Municipal Tort Liability in Operation, 54 HAnv. L. REy.
437,450 (1941).
20. Muskopf v. Corning Hosp. Dist, 55 Cal. 211,218,359 P.2d 457,461 (1961).
21. Molitor v. Kaneland Community Unit Dist. No. 302, supra note 11 at 40,
163 N.E.2d at 103.
22. 65 So. 2d 34, 39 (Fla. 1953) (dissenting opinion).
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pal immunity from tort liability should be handled by the Florida
judiciary rather than the legislature. Four years later the Supreme Court
23
of Florida adopted this attitude in Hargrove v. Town of Cocoa Beach.
Recognizing the confusion that resulted from the attempts by the
judiciary to "prune and pare" the rule of immunity rather than to bodily
uproot this outmoded concept, 24 the court held there was no basis for
insistence on legislative action in a matter that the courts themselves had
originated. The Hargrove decision is the culmination of the Florida
judiciary's struggle with the question of municipal tort immunity. In
this case the court joined forces with the commentators and assumed a
new official posture with regard to the tort liability of municipalities.
The plaintiff in the Hargrovecase sued the town of Cocoa Beach for
the wrongful death of her husband. The decedent had been placed in
the municipal jail while intoxicated. His cell filled with smoke during
the night, and he was suffocated. Plaintiff sought damages, alleging
negligence in leaving the jail unattended and the prisoner unprotected
against the fire. The trial court dismissed the complaint, ruling that the
municipality was immune from liability for this tort. The Supreme Court
25
reversed, ruling that,
We . . . now recede from our prior decisions which hold that
a municipal corporation is immune from liability for the torts of
police officers. Affirmatively we hold that a municipal corporation
may be held liable for the torts of police officers under the doctrine of respondeat superior. We think it advisable to protect our
conclusion against any interpretation that would impose liability
on the municipality in the exercise of legislative or judicial, or
quasi-legislative or quasi-judicial, functions....
Declaring that the rule of municipal immunity is anachronistic to our
concepts of democratic government, the court pointed
out that the
26
modem city is in effect a large business institution.
The court indicated an intent to establish a broad rule of municipal
liability, stating that the issue was whether "a municipal corporation
should continue to enjoy immunity from liability for the wrongful acts

23. 96 So. 2d 130 (Fla. 1957).
24. Id. at 132. The supreme court illustrated one such anomaly by remarking
that if a policeman negligently injures a person while driving a car, the municipal
corporation is liable, City of Avon Park v. Giddens, 158 Fla. 130, 27 So. 2d 825
(1946), but if the same officer gets out of the car and wrongfully assaults the person,
the municipality is immune from liability. City of Miami v. Bethel, 63 So. 2d 34
(Fla. 1953).
25. 96 So. 2d at 133.
26. Ibid.
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of police officers." 2 7 The court announced that "the time has arrived to
face this matter squarely in the interest of justice and place the responsibility for wrongs where it should be."28 However, elsewhere in the
opinion the court seemed to limit the rule it was setting out, saying
29
that,

Subject to the limitations above announced, we here merely
hold that when an individual suffers a direct, personal injury
proximately caused by the negligence of a municipal employee
while acting within the scope of his employment, the injured
individual is entitled to redress for the wrongs done.
It is obvious that Hargroveis valid precedent only for a case involving a
negligent tort. However, the rationale of the decision and the policy
considerations underlying it would seem equally applicable to intentional torts. Thus, it is difficult to ascertain precisely the extent to which
the Florida court intended to establish municipal liability-whether the
municipality is liable for all the wrongful acts of municipal employees or
only for negligent acts.
Disrucr CouRT OF APPEAL REACnON TO TM HARGRovE DEcisioN

The lower courts in Florida have generally refused to extend liability
beyond the strict holding of the original decision, and at times have
even proved reluctant to give full force and effect to it.
One example of this refusal is the rejection by several lower courts
of the contention that liability should be extended to hold municipal
corporations accountable for the intentional torts of their employees. On
the other hand, it should be recognized that liability has never been
denied solely on the basis that the tort involved was intentional. However, the historical classifications of negligent and intentional torts may
not be the actual basis of modem court rulings. It is difficult to determine
which category the court is using and the reasoning behind its choice.
In Middleton v. City of Fort Walton Beach,30 the plaintiff alleged
that he had been arrested by a policeman pursuant to a warrant known
by the officer to be void, and that the clerk of the municipal court had
acted falsely and maliciously in executing the jurat to the affidavit and
issuing the arrest warrant. Plaintiff contended that the Hargrove rationale compels the extension of the doctrine of respondeatsuperior to
intentional torts of municipal employees. The court declared that "incalculable mischief to the public welfare would unquestionably follow

27. Id. at 131.
28. Id. at 133.
29. Ibid.
30. 118 So. 2d 431 (1st D.C.A. Fla. 1959).
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if the doctrine contended for were established."3 ' However, the court
evaded this problem by characterizing the acts involved as quasijudicial, and thus falling within an exception of Hargrove. In a 1961
case 32 the First District Court of Appeal expressly stated by way of
dicta that the Hargrove decision should not be extended to include intentional torts of municipal employees. Such statements are contradictory to Ragans v. City of Jacksonvile33 in which the court stated that, in
view of the Hargrove case, municipal tort liability could not be validly
restricted to suits arising out of negligence. 3 4 The action in the Ragans
case was brought against the city for injuries sustained by plaintiff as a
result of an alleged assault during arrest by a city police officer. The
Jacksonville charter 5 contained a provision restricting tort suits against
the city solely to cases in which the damages are attributable to gross
negligence. The court declared that if the provision were valid it would
preclude suits to recover damages flowing from an intentional tort committed by a city employee while acting within the scope of his employment. The question of municipal liability for intentional torts is further
confused by the two escape valves used by the courts to avoid dealing
directly with it.
In the first place, the court can ignore the question and refuse to
apply any legal tag at all to the tort; this is apparently what was done in
City of Miami v. Albro.36 Plaintiff brought an action for wrongful and
malicious arrest and for unlawful imprisonment. While protesting what
he considered an unlawful arrest, the plaintiff was pushed toward the
rear door of the police vehicle. In the process his arm was broken by a
police officer who was holding the plaintiff in such a way that his right
arm was bent behind his back. Commenting that the use of excessive
force in making an arrest without a warrant could not come within the
37
rule of immunity set forth in the Middleton case, the court ruled,
without expressly designating the tort as intentional or negligent, that a
municipality may be liable for torts such as that alleged in the complaint. Since the tort involved in this case is similar to the one committed
in Ragans, the inference of this decision corresponds to the inference in
the Ragans case, that the Hargrove principle is not limited solely to
negligent torts.

31. Id. at 432.
32. Thompson v. City of Jacksonville, 130 So. 2d 105, 107 (1st D.C.A. Fla.
1961), (dictum), cert. denied, and 147 So. 2d 530 (Fla. 1962).

83. 106 So. 2d 860 (1st D.C.A. Fla. 1958).
34. Id. at 862.
35. Fla. Laws 1919, ch. 8279, as amended, Fla. Laws Ex. Sess. 1925, ch. 11564.
36. 120 So. 2d 23 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1960).
37. Id. at 26.
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In the second place, the court can avoid the question
by basing its
38
holding on the principle in Brown v. Town of Eustis:
[A] municipal corporation is not liable for the tortious acts
committed by its officers as such, unless the acts complained of
were committed in the exercise of some corporate power, or in
the performance of some duty imposed upon the municipality by
law, and that it is not liable for the unlawful or prohibited acts
of its officers or agents.
This formula is founded upon an extremely shadowy distinction, and an
intentional tort of the municipal employee can always be classified as
simply an unlawful act by the employee. Thus, the false and malicious
arrest by the police officer in the Middleton case was deemed by the
court to be a quasi-judicial corporate function of a municipal employee,
whereas in Brown the malicious arrest without cause by the policeman
was held to be an unlawful and prohibited act. The act of arrest was in
effect declared by one court to be a lawful municipal function, and by a
second court to be an unlawful operation. Both decisions effectively
immunized the municipality from liability for these torts of the police
officers. The court concluded in City of Coral Gables v. Giblin30 that
the Hargrove decision did not overrule or modify the Brown principle
that liability of the municipal corporation stems from the negligent performance of a lawfully delegated duty rather than from the commission
of an unlawful, illegal, or prohibited act.
In summary, it seems that not only have the Florida courts generally
refused to advance beyond the immediate holding of Hargrove, but
they have tended to construe the decision strictly. The Florida Supreme
Court expressly excluded any imposition of liability on the municipality
in the exercise of legislative or judicial and quasi-legislative or quasijudicial functions as illustrated in such cases as Elrod v. City of Daytona
Beach4" and Akin v. City of Miami.4 '
The question raised in Elrod was whether the city is liable to a
plaintiff for injuries suffered because of the enforcement of an unconstitutional ordinance. The court held that the city was acting in its governmental capacity and no liability attaches to it for either nonuse or misuse
of power; the immunity from liability is not dependent upon the use of
the best means in the operation of the municipality's governmental
business.
In the Akin case, a building owner brought an action against the city
for damages resulting from its refusal to grant a building permit. The
38.
39.
40.
41.

92 Fla. 931, 933, 110 So. 873 (1926).
127 So. 2d 914 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1961).
132 Fla. 24, 180 So. 378 (1938).
65 So. 2d 54 (Fla. 1953).
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court declared that the exercise of the power to grant or to refuse a building permit is a purely governmental function; a municipality may not be
held liable in an action for damages if in the pursuance of its lawful
police power it acts in an unlawful or unauthorized manner.
Such a broad statement of this limitation of the rule of Hargrovehas
been criticized on the ground that the Florida court will apparently
deny liability for quasi-judicial and quasi-legislative activities, without
making a distinction between arbitrary and reasonable conduct. 42
Arguably, the failure to make such a distinction is more consistent with
the objectives of municipal immunity. Thus, the exceptions to the Hargrove rule provide a vehicle by which courts can avoid municipal
liability. The court in the Middleton case cited Akin as authority for the
court's quasi-judicial characterization. Ignoring the factual differences
between Akin and Middleton, the court with no explanation ruled that
the acts were quasi-judicial in character. The Middleton case involved
intentional acts of a police officer and a court clerk which resulted in
direct, personal injury, as opposed to Akin which concerned the act of
an official in the proper exercise of his discretion and within his jurisdiction as a quasi-judicial officer.
In recent Florida cases the Hargrove decision has been restricted
even apart from its express limitation.
In Gordon v. City of Belle Glade43 plaintiff brought action against
the city for damages for assault and battery and for false arrest and imprisonment. He alleged that he was negligently beaten by two city
policemen while being arrested without a warrant for an alleged act
that was not committed in the presence of the officers. Although the
complaint was dismissed on the grounds that the plaintiff failed to bring
the action within the statutory period, 44 the court discussed at length
the Hargrovecase and its implications. The court acknowledged that if
the dissents from City of Miami v. Bethel45 had been adopted by the
Hargrove court, the Hargrove case would control these facts, since the
acts of the policemen in this case are similar to those in Bethel. The court
reasoned, however, that because the Supreme Court in Hargrove referred to the dissents and yet did not overrule the case, the dissents
would not be controlling. The court said that this case falls within the
exception to the Hargrove rule, as did Bethel. The court in Hargrove
expressly suggested that "reference might properly be had to those
[dissenting] opinions for a more thorough and lucid explanation of our
justification for departure from the rule of municipal immunity."4 6 It is
42. 71 HAnv. L. REv. 744, 746 (1958).
43. 132 So. 2d 449 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1961).
44. FLA. STAT. §95.241 (1961).

45. 65 So. 2d 34 (Fla. 1953) (dissenting opinion).
46. Hargrove v. Town of Cocoa Beach, 96 So. 2d 130, 184 (Fla. 1957).
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a reasonable inference from this statement that the Hargrove court intended to impose liability in this type of situation by abolishing municipal immunity. From the court's analysis in Gordon it appears that had
the court reached the question, liability would have been denied.
In the action brought in McCannv. City of Lake Wales,47 for injuries
allegedly resulting from the negligence of a municipal employee, the
plaintiff contended that prior decisions sustaining the validity of statutes
requiring written notice of tort claims against municipalities as a condition precedent to suit, are no longer binding as precedents in view of the
Hargrove decision. The court upheld the statute, declaring that the
procedural requirement of notice is valid because'the Hargrovecase did
not destroy in toto the differences between private and municipal
48
corporations.
Steinhardt v. Town of North Bay Village49 has placed the greatest
restriction upon the effect of the Hargrove decision. Damages from the
city were claimed by landowners on the grounds that the municipal firemen had not been properly trained and that the fire truck had not been
properly equipped with water. The fire truck did not contain the proper
amount of water because the municipal employees had previously used
the water to water the lawns, and then had forgotten to replenish the
supply on the fire truck. The firemen did not know the location of the
nearest fire hydrant nor how to hook up the fire hoses. The firemen called
the Miami Beach Fire Department for assistance and instructions in
hooking up the equipment, but during the forty minutes it took for aid
to arrive, the plaintiffs building burned down. The plaintiffs contended
they had suffered a direct, personal injury proximately caused by the
negligence of a municipal employee while acting within the scope of
his employment, and that this case falls within the Hargrove rule of
liability. Although recognizing that Hargrove rejected the rule of municipal liability for some torts arising out of governmental functions, the
court ruled that here, just as in the Elrod case, the municipal officials
were performing functions that required the exercise of legislative or
quasi-legislative powers; the consequences of the acts, even if performed
improperly, are not subject to civil liability.50
If we look for reasonsrather than reasoning in the cases denying municipal liability for loss occasioned by the failure to extinguish fires, we will find reasons enough. The most influential
of these is the thought that a conflagration might cause losses, the
47.
48.
49.
2d 787
50.

144 So. 2d505 (Fla. 1962).
Id. at 506.
132 So. 2d 764 (3d D.C.A Fla. 1961), petition for cert. dismissed, 141 So.
(Fla. 1962).
182 So. 2d at 767.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1963

11

1963]

Florida LawNOTES
Review, Vol. 16, Iss. 1 [1963], Art. 5

payment of which would bankrupt the community. Closely allied
with this fear is the realization that the crushing burden of extensive losses can better be distributed through the medium of
private insurance.
It is extremely difficult to distinguish the negligence of the city in this
situation from that alleged in the Hargrove case resulting from leaving
the municipal jail unattended and the prisoner unprotected; this seems
to be precisely the type of situation in which the court in Hargrove
intended to impose liability upon the municipality.5 1
FuTURm IMPORT OF THE HARGEOVE DECIsIoN

Although, as a result of the constructions of the Hargrove doctrine
by the district courts of appeal, the law of tort liability of Florida municipalities is still marked by confusion and inconsistency, an overall
trend is apparent. That trend is toward the destruction of the barrier of
sovereign immunity, stripping the municipalities of their special status
and placing them in the same position as conventional employers. The
time is near at hand when the rules of vicarious liability will be as applicable to municipalities as to any other employer. The law of liability
of private corporations is tending to move away from a fault basis and
toward the principle that the enterprise itself should bear the losses it
causes; the law with respect to liability of public enterprises may move
perhaps even further in the same direction. A governmental unit is supported by taxation and is not dependent upon private investment or
profit. Thus, a large governmental unit is the best of all possible lossspreaders, particularly if its taxes are geared to ability to pay. The
ultimate principle may be that the taxpaying public should bear the
52
losses that result from governmental activity.
Judging from the language in the Hargrove opinion, this expansion
of municipal tort liability will be effected by Florida Supreme Court decisions which will defeat the lower courts' efforts to continue the protection afforded the municipality by a rule of immunity from tort liability.
The expanded tort liability will give rise to urgent new problems.
One problem is the peculiar situation of the small, Southern municipality, and the attitude of its citizens. The local government exists
primarily for regulation, and not as a convenient organization to perform
51. However, on petition for writ of certiorari in Steinhardt v. Town of North
Bay Village, 141 So. 2d 737 (1962), the supreme court held the petition was without
merit. Justice Drew dissented, saying that there was conflict bewteen the district
court of appeal's decision and the Hargrovecase.
52. Davis, Tort Liability of Governmental Units, 40 Mn. L. REv. 751, 811
(1956).
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business services for the people. It is more than a matter of the tax base;
it is a matter of a philosophy of the government's place and responsi4
bility.53 Moreover, the citizens often consider themselves as one and the
same with the community, and discourage suits against the municipal
government.
In addition, solutions are needed for a number of practical problems,
not previously encountered under the rule of municipal immunity, that
are inherent in the mechanics of a rule of liability: How are the claims
against the municipality to be handled? How is the municipality to meet
its obligations? What is the best way to protect officers and employees
from liability in carrying out their governmental duties? Can one system of responsibility be established that will be applicable to all divisions of -the governmental unit? 54 The imposition of municipal liability
requires establishment of appropriate administrative facilities to effectively handle liability claims.
Perhaps the most significant of all the problems to be faced is the
question of what limits should be placed upon the liability of the formerly immune municipality. The need for limits on liability for negligence or fault in some kinds of governmental activity has always been
recognized:"
There are certain public services which only the government
can adequately perform, as for example, the administration of
justice, the preservation of public peace and enforcement of the
laws, and the protection of the community from fire and disease.
It may hence be conceded that the principle of immunity for the
torts of officers engaged in "governmental" functions had some
legitimate field of application.
This proposition may explain why legislators and judges have so long resisted the commentators' plea for the abolition of sovereign immunity."
Vigorous judicial activity in this area of municipal liability creates
serious problems demanding legislative action. Although the courts can
establish a rule of liability for the torts of municipal employees, in the
final analysis the ultimate burden rests on the legislature to determine
the extent of the liability and to provide the machinery for compensation
of the losses resulting from governmental activity. The demand of the
legal commentators for judicial action on this question may soon be met

53. David, Public Tort Liability Administration: Basic Conflicts and Problems,

9 LAw &CoNTin'. 1hoB. 835,340 (1942).
54. 60 MIcE. L. REv. 379, 381 (1962).
55. Borchard, Government Liability in Tort, 34 YALE L.J. 229, 240 (1925).
56. Davis, supra note 52, at 792.
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